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Abstract— The best practice to prevent Cross Site Scripting 
(XSS) attacks is to apply encoders to sanitize untrusted data. To 
balance security and functionality, encoders should be applied to 
match the web page context, such as HTML body, JavaScript, 
and style sheets.  A common programming error is the use of a 
wrong encoder to sanitize untrusted data, leaving the application 
vulnerable. We present a security unit testing approach to detect 
XSS vulnerabilities caused by improper encoding of untrusted 
data. Unit tests for the XSS vulnerability are automatically 
constructed out of each web page and then evaluated by a unit 
test execution framework. A grammar-based attack generator is 
used to automatically generate test inputs. We evaluate our 
approach on a large open source medical records application, 
demonstrating that we can detect many 0-day XSS vulnerabilities 
with very low false positives, and that the grammar-based attack 
generator has better test coverage than industry best practices. 
Keywords—security; unit testing; injection attacks; program 
analysis; attack generation  
I. INTRODUCTION  
Cross Site Scripting (XSS) is one of the most common 
security vulnerabilities in web applications. Cross Site 
Scripting attacks occur when an attacker successfully injects a 
malicious JavaScript payload into a web page to be executed 
by users requesting such a web page.  Advised best practice to 
prevent XSS attacks is to encode untrusted program variables 
with dynamic content before their values are sent to the 
browser. While one can prevent all XSS attacks by using the 
most strict encoder, it also takes away many useful web site 
functions. To balance security and functionality, developers 
must therefore choose the appropriate encoder depending on 
the context of the content, such as HTML or JavaScript. Static 
analysis [15] techniques are widely used to ensure a web 
application uses encoding functions to sanitize untrusted data. 
However, static analysis cannot verify whether the correct 
encoding function is used. Acunetix Web Application 
Vulnerability Report [1] shows that nearly 38% and 33% of 
web sites were vulnerable to XSS attacks in 2015 and 2016 
respectively.  
In this paper we present a unit-testing based approach to 
automatically detect XSS vulnerabilities due to incorrect 
encoding function usage. We have built a proof-of-concept 
implementation for web applications written in Java and JSP. 
This approach can be extended to other server-side web 
programming languages as well (e.g. PHP and ASP). For the 
rest of this section, we provide a brief background on encoding 
and our approach. 
Well tested encoding functions have been written for 
content placed in the following contexts: HTML body, HTML 
attribute, CSS, URL, and JavaScript.  Consider the fragment of 
a JSP program shown in Fig 1. Native Java code is enclosed in 
<%  %>.  
1.  <% String pid = (String)request.getParameter("pid");  %> 
2.  <% String addr = (String) 
request.getParameter(“addr”);%> 
3.  <a href="javascript:void(0)" onclick="action(‘ 
<%=escapeHtml(pid) %> ’)">  mylink </a> 
4.  <p> <%=escapeHtml(addr) %> 
Fig. 1. Motivating Example 
 
This example has two user provided inputs: pid and addr. 
Variable pid is used as part of rendering an HTML anchor 
element on line 3, and addr is displayed in the HTML body on 
line 4. A maliciously supplied input for addr might be  
<script> atk(); </script>. 
If the encoding function, escapeHtml(), were not applied, 
this would cause the execution of the JavaScript function atk() 
on line 4. Encoding function escapeHtml() replaces < and > 
characters with &lt; and &gt; respectively and transforms the 
malicious input into the following string, preventing atk(); 
from being interpreted as a JavaScript program by the browser: 
&lt;script&gt; atk(); &lt;/script&gt; 
 However, the same encoding function does not work for 
the case on line 3. A malicious input for pid might be the 
following 
’); atk(); // 
It will pass escapeHtml() unchanged. The rendered anchor 
element would be as follows. 
<a href= “javascript:void(0)”  
onclick= ”action( ‘’);atk(); // ’ ) ” > mylink </a> 
JavaScript function atk() will be executed when the link is 
clicked. The correct JavaScript encoder would, in this case, 
replace the single quote character with \’ to prevent this attack.  
There are also cases where more than one encoding 
function must be used (e.g. an untrusted input used in both  
JavaScript and URL contexts). The order of applying encoders 
is sometimes important as well. Unfortunately, there is no 
systematic way to detect such vulnerabilities.   
Other researchers have looked at using type inference to 
automatically detect the context of an untrusted variable so the 
correct encoding function can be automatically applied. To aid 
type inference, such efforts all rely on template languages with 
stronger type systems, such as Closure Templates [7] or 
HandleBars [38]. Such approaches have several limitations. 
First many legacy web applications do not use template 
languages. Second, type inference is not fully successful even 
with template languages. For example, a research team from 
Yahoo! found that they could identify the correct context in 
about 90.9% of applications written in HandleBars. Other 
researchers have also shown that type inference is not always 
accurate for some program constructs written in Closure 
Templates [32].  
Detecting XSS vulnerabilities through black box testing has 
also been researched, and there are several open source and 
commercial implementations [5, 9, 22, 30]. In these 
approaches, a vulnerability is detected  by inspecting web 
application outputs. If an injected attack payload is found in the 
output, the application is deemed vulnerable. Because the web 
application output is not rendered by a browser, this evaluation 
method can have high false positives. Black box testing could 
also have high false negative rates as well, due to inadequate 
test path coverage [5].  
Our approach is to add testing for XSS vulnerabilities to  
unit testing, a common software development practice. For 
example, in iTrust [23], one large open source application we 
studied, unit test code is available for almost all web pages. 
Our approach has three components. First, to ensure XSS 
vulnerability test coverage, we construct multiple unit test files 
based on one given JSP file in the application. Second, we 
confirm each vulnerability by rendering attacked pages using 
JWebUnit. Third, we have a structured way of generating 
attack strings for test input. 
There are several original contributions of this work. We 
discover vulnerabilities that cannot be found via program 
analysis. We minimize false positives by confirming 
vulnerabilities via execution. False positives are a major 
obstacle for wide adoption of software security tools [5, 30].  
Our testing approach can pinpoint exact locations of 
vulnerabilities, making it easy for remediation.  We also 
minimize false negatives by ensuring path coverage for unit 
tests as well as systematically generating attack strings using 
BNF grammars based on modeling how browsers interpret 
JavaScript programs. 
II.  UNIT TEST CONSTRUCTION 
To ensure test path coverage, we construct a set of unit tests 
automatically based on each JSP file with the goal that if the 
original JSP file has an XSS vulnerability due to incorrect 
encoder usage, at least one of the constructed unit tests will be 
similarly vulnerable as well. We refer to the JSP file in the 
application as the original unit test and each unit test JSP file 
generated as the XSS unit test. The following are  inputs for 
XSS unit test construction: (1) source code and (2) untrusted 
sources and (3) sinks.  Untrusted sources are Java functions or 
statements  from which malicious data can be brought into the 
web application, such as request.getParameter(). Sinks are 
statements used to generate the HTML outputs to be rendered 
by browsers. There are a number of sinks in the context of JSP 
applications: out.write() , out.print(), out.println(), 
out.append(), or  <%=  %>.  We illustrate the unit test 
generation using Figure 2 as the original code and Figure 3 as 
one of the constructed XSS unit tests.  
To focus our discussions, we assume the application 
encodes all untrusted variables using known encoding 
functions. Taint analysis can readily discover cases where an 
untrusted variable appears in a sink without encoding. Our 
vulnerability model is a situation where an encoder does not 
match the application’s HTML document context.  
 A typical JSP file contains both HTML and JavaScript 
specifications as well as Java variables and statements, referred 
to as host variables and statements. The term HTML document 
context refers to HTML and JavaScript specifications in the 
JSP file. To avoid false negatives, we capture all sinks in all 
possible HTML document contexts. For convenience of 
performing program analysis, we replace all HTML elements 
with equivalent Java statements. This task is accomplished by 
using a JSP code analyzer that uses Java output generation 
commands such as  out.write() to enclose HTML  and 
JavaScript parts of the JSP files. For example, the HTML 
elements in line 4 of Figure 2 are replaced by lines 4-6 in  
Figure 3.  
Java branch statements could impact a sink’s HTML 
document context as illustrated by Figure 2. Untrusted variable 
ordID is in a JavaScript context in the “then” branch of a Java 
if statement (line 4). In the “else” branch of the same Java if 
statement, variable ordID is in an HTML body context (line 6). 
To ensure we test all possible HTML contexts we test each of 
the Java if branches in a separate  unit test JSP file. 
Fig. 2. Original Source Code 
Fig. 3. Generated Unit Test 
1. String ordID = request.getParameter("order"); 
2. ordID= escapeHtml(ordID); 
//”then” branch of if statemenet 
3. boolean e1= (editMode); 
4. out.write("<a onclick=\"edit(' "); 
5. out.write(ordID); 
6. out.write(" ')\" href=\"#\" > Edit Order</a>");  
1. <% String ordID =       request.getParameter("order"); 
2. ordID = escapeHtml(ordID); 
3.  if(editMode){ %> 
4.    <a onclick="edit('<%= ordID %>')"  href="#" > Edit 
Order </a> 
5.  <% } else { %> 
6.  <span> Order:<%= ordID %> </span> 
7.  <% } %> 
A control flow analysis is performed to generate the control 
flow graphs for each JSP file. Multiple XSS unit tests will be 
created when the JSP file contains if or switch/case Java 
statements.  For example, the source code of Figure 1 contains 
the following two possible execution paths: 
• Line numbers 1,2,3,4 (then branch) 
• Line numbers 1,2,3,6 (else branch) 
Two XSS unit tests are generated for this example, each 
corresponds to one execution path containing no branching 
logic and each has a sink containing one untrusted variable. 
Execution paths without sinks and untrusted variables are 
discarded as they are not vulnerable to XSS attacks. 
Figure 3 is a XSS unit test extracted from the “then-branch” 
of the Java if-statement in Figure 2. The untrusted variable in 
this unit test is ordID, which appears in a sink statement (<%=  
%>). The sanitizing function is on line 2. To avoid any runtime 
exceptions or miss any statements affecting the HTML context 
we also keep the conditional expression used in the if statement 
in both branches, which is shown as line number 3 of Figure 3, 
by assigning the value of the conditional expression(editMode) 
to a Boolean variable e1. 
While it is possible for branch statements written in 
JavaScript to change the HTML document context of a sink, 
we expect such cases to be rare. This is because sinks are part 
of the application logic written in Java, so it is natural for 
developers to use Java to express changes in HTML document 
context. We thus assume that JavaScript code does not change 
the  HTML document context of sinks. We will assess this 
assumption in the evaluation section.  
Figure 4 shows how ZAP [30], a popular security testing 
tool, conducts tests. The original JSP unit test page is launched 
on a web server to set up the session. A proxy captures the 
session information. The captured session is sent as part of 
subsequent requests by ZAP for security testing. We adopt the 
same strategy to execute XSS unit tests. Like ZAP, we run the 
original unit test to set up the session and capture the session 
id. We then run all the XSS unit tests on the same web server. 
The captured session id  is sent along with attack strings to run 
the XSS unit tests.  Each XSS unit test shares the same session 
as the original unit test, as session is global across all JSP 
pages on the server.  
 
Fig. 4. ZAP’s Testing Architecture 
Ideal case. In the ideal case, the original JSP file contains one 
untrusted variable as is the case in Figure 2. For such a case, 
there are no false negatives because all possible HTML 
document contexts are captured by at least one XSS unit test.  
If the original code was vulnerable due to using the wrong 
encoding function, then at least one of the XSS unit tests 
would be vulnerable. 
 
We define a false positive as a situation where the 
application’s context and the applied encoding function are 
matched (safe) in the original source code, but the encoding 
function is detected as vulnerable (mismatched) by a XSS unit 
test. This is not possible for the ideal case because our XSS 
unit test construction process preserves the HTML document 
contexts of the original JSP file.  
 
A. Injection Points  
We assume that taint sources are specified as a set of Java 
methods, such as user forms and database queries. Taint flow 
analysis is used to identify injection points in the program. 
Injection points are places that the variable containing the 
attack string (as an input parameter for the unit test) should be 
used in. This variable is used as the value of the tainted 
variable that is an argument of the first encoder function. Since 
a XSS unit test contains no branching logic, detection of such 
injection points is straightforward.  Figure 5 shows part of an 
original source code. Untrusted variable fName is used in a 
sink on line 5 after being sanitized using two encoders on lines 
3 and 4. This variable originated from variable prf as result of a 
database call, searchProfile(), a tainted source on line 2. In the 
corresponding unit test in Figure 6, variable containing the 
attack string atk will be used as the input parameter of the first 
application of the escapeHtml() encoder, on line 3.  
We also instrument each XSS unit test so that it reports the 
line number in the source code if a vulnerability is found as 
shown in line 6 of Figure 6. We identify the line number of 
each sink statement in the original JSP file. Suppose the line 
number of a sink in the original JSP file is L1: 
L1: <%= escapeHTML(x)%> 
 
 
1. <% List<Profile> prf; 
2. prf= searchProfile(customerID); 
3. fName = escapeHtml(prf.Name); 
4. fName = escapeJavaScript(fName); %> 
5. <%= "Full Name:" + fName %> 
Fig. 5.  Original Code with Injection Point 
//atk is a string parameter generated by the test driver 
1. atk = request.getParameter("atk"); 
2. List<Profile> prf; 
3. prf= searchProfile(customerID); 
// Injection applies to escapeHtml as the value of prf.Name 
4. fName = escapeHtml(atk); 
5. fName = escapeJavaScript(fName); 
// sink line number in original code = 5 
6. out.write( addLine("Full Name:" + fName , "5")); 
Fig. 6.  Generated Unit Test with Injection Point 
Web Server 
(Unit Test)Browser Proxy 
 
We add a function to each unit test to add the line number of 
the sink(L1) to the attack string: 
 
out.write(escapeHTML(addLine(x,L1) )) 
 
Function addLine() adds the line number as a parameter to the 
attack payload. In our evaluation described below, this line 
number will be added to the page’s title to identify the 
vulnerable line.  
 
Multiple Variables: An XSS unit test may contain multiple 
untrusted variables. Figure 7 shows two examples.  Best 
secure programing practices [35] suggest that if both variables 
are properly sanitized with respect to the expected HTML 
document context, their combination should be safe as well. 
We refer to this as the independent encoding assumption.  
This assumption allows us to test one variable at a time by 
holding the rest of the untrusted variables constant. To avoid 
runtime errors, we select numeric character 1 as the constant 
value to be assigned to all other variables while one variable is 
being tested. This is because 1 can be interpreted either as a 
character or as a numeric value. We also evaluate the 
assumption of encoding independence in section 4.   
III.  ATTACK EVALUATION  
The goal of attack evaluation is to assess whether an XSS 
unit test is vulnerable to any of the XSS attack strings. One 
widely used security testing approach, exemplified by the 
popular black box testing tool ZAP [30], is to look up the 
attack payload in the response page. The rationale for this 
approach is that if an attack payload can bypass the encoder 
function intact, an attack could occur. Unfortunately this 
approach can lead to high false positives. A successful attack 
payload must be compatible with the context it is injected into.  
 For instance, Figure 8 shows a situation in which an 
HTML body encoder is used to sanitize a user-entered 
parameter on  line 1. Line 2 is  an attack string from  ZAP’s 
attack repository. Line 3 shows a part of the output of the web 
page when this attack string is applied. Since the encoder does 
not alter the attack string, ZAP’s test evaluation mechanism 
would report this page as vulnerable. This is a false positive 
because this attack cannot be executed in the HTML context. 
Fig. 7. Multiple Variables 
1. <div> <%= escapeHtml(request.getParameter("atk"))%>  
</div> 
  
2. Attack String :  + alert(1) 
3. <div>  + alert(1)  </div> 
Fig. 8. False Positive in Attack Detection   
A. Attack payload  
Our approach is to execute unit tests in headless browser 
components such as JWebUnit, a widely used testing tool for 
web pages. Vulnerabilities are only reported if successful 
execution of an attack payload by JWebUnit is detected. For 
the attack payload, we use a JavaScript function attack(n), 
which takes as parameter the line number of the sink statement 
being tested. It changes the web page title by appending that 
line number.  
B. Test driver 
Figure 9 shows the XSS unit test driver.  Lines 1 and 2 are 
for  test preparation. Function sessionPreparation() sets up the 
execution environment by applying captured session 
information. The rest of the test driver invokes the XSS unit 
test by applying attack strings. After initializing an instance of 
WebTester (a subclass of JWebUnit) on line 1, each iteration of 
the loop on line 2 takes one attack vector (atk)  and invokes the 
XSS unit test page (unitTest_1.jsp) with the attack string as a 
parameter (line 4). Line 5 pauses to let the unit test page be 
rendered completely.  Line 6 asserts whether the attack is 
successful by checking the title of the response page.  If the 
attack is successful, the page title contains line number(s) of 
the vulnerable sinks, helping developers to fix vulnerabilities. 
C. Handling events   
In order to find vulnerabilities associated with tag events, 
we must trigger each event with a JavaScript body.  There are 
near 88 possible events in HTML5, some of them can only be 
triggered based on particular user interaction such as 
onmouseover or a run time condition such as onerror.  
 
Public void prepare() 
{ 
1. wt = new  WebTester(); 
2. sessionPreparation(); //other preparations such as proxy 
} 
public void run() { 
3.   for( String atk :atkVectors){   
// Invoking the Unit Test 
4.   wt.gotoPage("unit_1.jsp?atk="+atk);      
5.   sleep(100); 
6.   verifyResponse(wt);     
   }  
} 
Fig. 9.  Test Driver with Test Preparation 
1. var tags = document.all;     
2. for (var i=0; i <tags.length;i++){  e= tags[i]; 
3.  if (typeof e.onfocus == "function")   { 
4.     event = e.onfocus;   
5.     e.onclick=event; 
6.     e.click();    } 
   … check for other events 
Fig. 10. Triggering all events having a handler  
1) <%= escapeHtml(var1) + "constant" + escapeHtml(var2) 
%> 
2) <%= escapeHtml(var1+ "constant" + var2) %> 
However, since all events share the same syntax, we can 
substitute events that cannot be easily simulated in a test 
environment with an event that can be easily triggered. 
We verified that in major browsers (Chrome, Safari, 
Firefox) event onclick can be associated with every HTML tag 
and it can be triggered using a JavaScript API. Figure 10 shows 
a JavaScript program we use to go through all tags in the 
DOM.  For each tag, the program checks if the tag has an event 
with an event body (line 3).  If a tag has a body, the program 
assigns the event body to an onclick event and triggers it 
programmatically.   
IV.  ATTACK GENERATION 
Because our test evaluation is based on execution of attack 
strings, we must make sure attack strings are syntactically 
correct.   Furthermore, we want to include all possible types of 
attack scenarios. Related work in generating XSS attacks relies 
on either expert input [21], or on reported attacks [22, 37].  It is 
difficult to show that all possible attack scenarios are included 
using these approaches.  
Our approach consists of two components. First we use  
grammars to model how JavaScript payloads are interpreted by 
a typical browser.  Assuming this grammar is accurate, then a 
successful attack must follow the rules of this grammar.  
Second, we devise an algorithm to derive attack strings 
systematically based on the grammar. Assuming the grammar 
accurately models the way the browser interprets JavaScript, 
and assuming that the attack derivation algorithm can generate 
at least one attack string for every type of attack, then our 
approach would cover all possible attack scenarios. It is 
possible that either the grammar may have missed a way by 
which a browser interprets JavaScript, or the attack 
enumeration algorithm failed to consider a possible derivation 
path based on the grammar. Through peer review, we can 
improve both components in a way similar to how crypto 
algorithms are revised. 
A.  Attack Grammars  
A typical web browser contains multiple interpreters: 
HTML, CSS, URI and JavaScript. The browser behavior can 
be modeled as one interpreter passing control to another upon 
parsing specific input tokens while rendering HTML 
documents. We refer to the event of interpreter switching as 
context switching. For example, the URI parser transfers the 
control to the JavaScript parser if it detects input  javascript: (if 
supported by the browser) as in the case:   
<img src=”javascript: atk();”> 
 
A successful XSS attack is to induce the JavaScript 
interpreter to execute the attack payload.  We use a set of 
context free grammar (CFG) rules to specify possible input 
strings that cause the browser to activate the JavaScript 
interpreter to execute an attack payload. Portners et. al. [31] 
observed that a successful XSS attack must either call a 
JavaScript function (e.g. an API), or make an assignment (e.g. 
change the DOM). In JavaScript, wherever an assignment 
operation can be executed, a function call can also be made. 
Therefore, without loss of generality, we assume the attack 
payload is a function call atk() that changes the title of the 
webpage.  
Like Halfond et. al [19], we divide the CFG into different 
sections: URI, CSS, HTML, Event and JavaScript. In each 
section we specify possible transitions to cause a JavaScript 
interpreter to execute an attack payload. We will then integrate 
these contexts to generate attack strings. Throughout the paper 
we will use the following convention: upper case words for 
non-terminals, lower case words for terminals, symbols sq, dq, 
rp, lp, eq for single quote(‘), double quote(“), right parenthesis, 
left parenthesis and equal sign characters respectively.  
 
1) URI context:    
URI (Uniform Resource Identifier) strings identify 
locations of resources such images or script files. Based on 
RFC 3986, they have the following generic syntax:  
scheme:[//[user:password@]host[:port]][/]path[?query][#frag
ment] 
 
Here, the scheme represents the type of protocol (such as 
ftp or http)  used to access a resource, and the rest of the string 
expresses the authority and path information required to 
identify the resource. To cause the URI interpreter to switch to 
the JavaScript interpreter, the scheme must be equal to the 
keyword javascript, followed by JavaScript statements.  Other 
possible schemes include http, ftp, and https. Since no 
JavaScript can be injected into schemes other than scheme 
javascript, we concentrate on describing URIs that contains the 
JavaScript scheme [11]. An URI can be properly interpreted by 
a browser only as a value of an expected attribute of a host 
context. We continue with the example of  
<img src=”javascript: atk();”>, 
where src is the source attribute of the HTML img tag. It is 
referred to as URIHOST.  Figure 11 represents the grammar 
for URI. Rule URIATRIB specifies a URI attribute consisting 
of a URIHOST name and the URLVAL.  Rule URIHOST lists 
all possible URI host contexts in an HTML document. Again, 
for the purpose of generating attack strings, we only consider a 
URI of the JavaScript scheme. PAYLOAD is a special 
nonterminal representing a JavaScript attack payload. It signals 
to our attack generator that a context switch to JavaScript is 
possible at this point. 
 
<URIATRIB> ::= URIHOST  eq  URIVAL 
<URIHOST> ::= src | href | codebase | cite|action | 
background | data | classid | longdesc|profile |usemap | 
formaction|icon | manifest | poster | srcset | archive  
<URIVAL>::= sq URI sq | dq URI dq | URI 
<URI> ::= javascript: PAYLOAD 
Fig. 11. URI Grammar 
 
2) CSS Context:   
Cascading Style Sheets (CSS) specifications can be either 
contained in a CSS file or placed directly in HTML elements, 
e.g. tag definitions (using the style attribute or <style> blocks). 
A context switch from the CSS interpreter to the JavaScript 
interpreter is possible only when a URI is a property of a CSS-
style element, specified by function  url(). Figure 12 lists rules 
for URI to be included as part of a CSS-style element, starting 
with tokens style=.  Rule STYLE defines a CSS  style as a list 
of properties composed of  name PROPNAME and value 
PROPVAL. Rule PROPNAME lists all possible properties 
requiring URI strings.  PROPVAL specifies how function  url()  
uses URI non-terminals to include URI context.  
3) Event Context:   
HTML events, such as onfocus and onload, can cause 
context switches to JavaScript. Grammar rules in Figure 13 
define an HTML event attribute composed of an event name 
EVENTNAME and value EVENTVAL. Although types of 
possible events vary with HTML tags, we found that the 
onclick event can be triggered in all HTML tags. As mentioned 
previously, we change all events in the source code to the 
onclick event.  Rule EVENTVAL defines the value of the 
event which is a JavaScript statement to be executed upon the 
specified event, as represented by the special nonterminal 
PAYLOAD.   
4) Integrating the contexts into HTML.  
Having modeled context switches in URI, CSS, and Event, 
we integrate them in an attack grammar for HTML in Figure 
14. Rule HTML defines tags as a set of elements represented 
by the ELEM rule. Some tags cannot have tag bodies (such as 
img, input or param tags). Tag script and style  are special in 
that their entire body is interpreted as JavaScript and CSS 
respectively. Tags textarea and title can only contain text 
characters in their bodies, thus JavaScript programs cannot be 
injected. These special tags are reflected in ELEM rules 
defining these tag categories using corresponding rule names. 
We use rule IMG to define tag img as a representative to model 
the rest of tags, as they all share the same syntax. This rule 
defines an img tag as a tag name followed by a list of attributes 
ATRIBULIST. In ATTRBLIST, the browser can switch to the 
JavaScript interpreter depending on the attribute type: one of 
URI, CSS, and EVENT. Attack grammars for these cases have 
been described in detail earlier. 
5) JavaScript.  
JavaScript code can be placed either directly in HTML 
elements (e.g. through tag events such as onclick) or in 
<script> blocks.  Attackers can inject a malicious payload into 
a block of vulnerable JavaScript code. When attacking the 
JavaScript context, no interpreter switch is needed, a successful 
attack must manipulate the JavaScript interpreter into 
executing the payload, attack().   
Injection points in JavaScript are (Java) host variables. While 
host variables could be used in any JavaScript construct, such 
as part of a variable or function name (e.g., var  idx<%= 
varName%> = ‘value’;), such cases make little sense. Host 
variables are primarily used to pass server-side values to 
JavaScript code. Thus we only consider scenarios where attack 
scripts are injected as part of a string or a numeric literal in 
expressions as illustrated by the following examples.  
  
<STYLEATRIB> ::=    style eq  STYLEVAL
<STYLEVAL> ::=  (sq STYLE sq) | (dq STYLE dq') | 
(STYLE)  
<STYLE> ::= CSSPROP*  
<CSSPROP> ::= PROPNAME : PROPVAL;  
<PROPNAME> ::= background-image | list- style-image| 
content | cursor | cue-after | cue-before 
<PROPVAL> ::= url(URI) 
Fig. 12. CSS Grammar 
<EVENTATRIB>::= EVENTNAME eq EVENTVAL
<EVENTNAME>::=onclick  
<EVENTVAL> ::= sq PAYLOAD sq | dq PAYLOAD dq | 
PAYLOAD
Fig. 13.  Event Grammar  
<HTML> := ELEM* 
<ELEM> := TEXT | STYLE | SCRIPT |IMG 
<TEXT> := TITLE | TEXTAREA  
<TAREA> := <textarea> CDATA </textarea> 
<STYLE> := <style> CSSPROP* </style> 
<SCRIPT> := <script> PAYLOAD </script> 
<IMG>:=  <img ATRIBLIST> 
<ATRIBLIST>::=  ATTRIBUTE*   
<ATTRIBUTE> ::= URIATRIB | STYLEATRIB | 
EVENTATRIB 
Fig. 14. Integration Grammar. 
“20<%= hostVar %>”        
20<%= hostVar %>  
20 * <%= hostVar %>  
func( “a”,<%= hostVar %>, 1)    
: Part of String 
: Part of Number 
: Operands 
: Parameter
 
The goal of the attack is to turn the host variable into an 
expression so a function call can be made. A successful attack 
can be any syntactically correct expression. Without loss of 
generality, we generate attack expressions using only the + 
operator. The resulting expression is referred to as an additive 
expression. Its grammar is shown in Figure 15. The first two 
lines in Figure 15 define additive expressions as expressions 
composed of multiple string/numeric literals or expressions 
concatenated to each other using the plus(+) operator. 
PAYLOAD non-terminal is a placeholder for attack payloads. 
AdditiveExp = PrimaryExp AdditivePart 
AdditivePart = (+  PrimaryExpr)*  
PrimaryExp = PAYLOAD | Literal 
Literal = dq 1 dq | sq 1  sq | 1 
Fig. 15. JavaScript Additive Expression Grammar. 
 
B.  Attack String Generation  
The goal of the attack string generation is to generate all 
possible types of attacks using the attack grammar. Space 
limitations only permit us to describe our algorithm through a 
series of examples in this section. 
1) Sentence Derivation  
We generate XSS attack strings based on any of the attack 
grammars described above by constructing a leftmost 
derivation tree [20] from the start symbol of each grammar.  
The following code shows the steps of deriving an attack string 
based on the HTML image tag.   
ELEM = IMG   
::= <img ATTRIBUTE*> 
::= <img EVENTATRIB > 
::= <img EVENTNAME eq EVENTVAL> 
::= <img onclick = "PAYLOAD" > 
 
2) Generating attack strings 
Attacks can be injected in any part of an HTML element, a 
CSS block, or JavaScript expression. Consider the following 
example where a host variable, InjPoint, is in the value part of 
the fName variable as part of a function parameter.   
var fName =func(”Dr. <%= InjPoint %> ”); 
 
The attack script must take into consideration the existing 
context both to the left and to the right of the injection point. 
These existing contexts are referred to as left context and right 
context respectively as described in our previous work [28]. 
They are shown in bold above. To fit the attack into the left 
context, one may close the string parameter with character ” 
followed by a context switch using a new expression. The 
resulting attack string would be:  
“ + attack() +” 
Furthermore, the attack must consider existing context to 
the right of the injection point by relying on existing right 
context to complete the attribute element. The successful 
injection is shown as follows. 
var fName =func(”Dr.” +attack()+” ”); 
If we regard derivations starting from the start symbol of 
the grammar as complete sentences of the grammar, to 
systematically generate attacks for  all possible existing left 
and right contexts, we must produce all possible partial 
sentences. The following is a possible derivation for an 
additive expression in JavaScript leading to a complete 
sentence: 
AdditiveExp = PrimaryExp AdditivePart 
… ::=Literal AdditivePart 
… ::= “1” AdditivePart 
… ::= “1” (+  PrimaryExpr)* 
… ::= “1” + PrimaryExp  + PrimaryExp  
… ::= “1” + PAYLOAD + ”1” 
For each complete sentence derived from the attack 
grammar,  we generate multiple versions of partial sentence as 
potential attack strings. 
Each version will be shaped by removing one token from 
the either the beginning or from the end of the previous version 
starting from the initial sentence. These versions represent 
different possible ways an attack can be successfully 
interpreted by the browser taking advantage of the injection 
point’s left and right contexts.  
To consider existing contexts to the left of the injection 
point we generated different partial sentences by removing one 
token from the beginning of the previous version. This 
removing process will continue until the first payload symbol 
is reached. For example, given the additive expression derived 
earlier, the following versions of attack strings can be 
generated. 
Initial Sentence: “1” + PAYLOAD + “1” 
1” + PAYLOAD + “1” 
” + PAYLOAD + “1” 
+ PAYLOAD + “1” 
PAYLOAD + “1” 
 
To consider existing contexts to the right of the injection 
point, we systematically generate multiple versions of any 
attack string by removing one token from the end of the 
previous one until the payload symbol is reached. Then the 
following four more versions of attack strings will be generated 
based on the attack string (” + PAYLOAD + “1”): 
“+PAYLOAD + “1 
“+PAYLOAD + “ 
“+PAYLOAD + 
“+PAYLOAD 
The second version can be successfully injected into host 
variable InjPoint. 
3) Closures  
Closure operators (*, +) in our attack grammar may result 
in an infinite number of derivations. The following example 
shows a simple derivation by applying the closure operator up 
to two times( * = 2). A total of six derivations are possible. 
HTML := ELEM* 
ELEM := (IMG | SCRIPT)* 
:= IMG 
:= IMG IMG 
:= IMG SCRIPT 
:= SCRIPT 
:= SCRIPT SCRIPT 
:= SCRIPT IMG 
 
To generate a finite set of attack vectors, we observe that 
attack scripts containing more than one attack payload are 
redundant. This is because a successful attack only needs to 
execute one payload. For a set of attack grammars, we 
empirically determine how many times closure operators need 
to be applied. We compute leftmost derivations by applying 
different upper bounds on closure operators until no more 
attack strings with one payload can be added. For example, for 
the grammars presented here, applying each closure operator 3 
times does not generate new attack strings with one payload 
over applying each closure operator 2 times. Note that current 
attack grammars do not contain recursive rules. We are 
examining how to handle recursive rules. 
  
In summary we generate an initial set of attack strings by 
deriving sentences from the start symbol of  each grammar 
(URI, CSS, HTML, EVENT, JavaScript). Each closure 
operation is applied up to two times. For each attack string in 
the initial set, we generate additional versions of the attack 
string by dropping tokens from both the left and right as 
described above. Only attack strings with a single context-
switch are included in the final set of attack strings for unit 
testing. Because a successful attack script only needs one 
working context-switching mechanism and all possible 
combinations of context-switching are generated, thus 
combining them in one attack script is not required.   
 
V. EVALUATIONS 
Our evaluation uses  iTrust, an open source medical records 
application  with 112,000 lines of Java/JSP code [23].  We 
seek to evaluate (1) the performance of our XSS vulnerability 
detection, (2) the completeness of our attack generation 
approach, and (3) the computational performance of our 
approach. Project iTrust has 235 JSP files and we randomly 
selected  ⅓ or 70 JSP files for this evaluation. 
 
A. Vulnerability Detection  
We compared our XSS unit testing approach with security 
black box testing using the popular open source security 
testing tool ZAP.  Table 1 summarizes our evaluation results.  
 
Table 1: Summary of vulnerability findings 
 Vulnerabilities 
reported 
True Positive False 
Positive 
ZAP 31 9 22 
XSS Unit 
Testing 17 17 0 
 
We found 17 zero-day vulnerabilities in 13% of JSP pages 
tested. Most vulnerabilities are due to the use of HTML 
encoding in JavaScript context, as shown below: 
 
<a onclick="func('<%= escapeHtml(input) %>')" ...>Link</a> 
 
ZAP has a very high false positive rate: 70%. Our approach 
has no false positives. The reason for ZAP’s high false positive 
rates is because it does not confirm test result via execution, as 
illustrated in Section III Figure 8. False positives for our case 
are still possible as illustrated by the code in Figure 16 where a 
JavaScript encoder should have been used. However, in this 
case statement containing substring() has the side effect of 
sanitizing the output making this situation not exploitable. 
Fig. 16. Possible False Positive. 
Our approach found 8 vulnerabilities ZAP did not find. All 
these cases are due to lack of test coverage by ZAP. ZAP did 
not test all execution paths. In our approach, a separate XSS 
unit test for each possible execution branch in the original JSP 
file will be evaluated. 
In addition, we investigated  iTrust  for any JavaScript flow 
control statements causing different  HTML contexts at client 
side.  We could not find any JavaScript code inducing 
vulnerabilities that cannot be detected.  We examined iTrust 
for sinks having multiple variables. Out of 2268 sinks, 27 
contain multi-variables. In all sinks with multiple variables, our 
encoding independence assumption is true. That is to say, 
encoding each variable separately adequately allows us to test 
for XSS attacks. 
 
B. Attack generation  
We compare our grammar based attack generation with two 
well regarded open source XSS attack repositories: ZAP and 
HTML5 Security web site [21]. We applied these attack 
repositories to  the XSS unit tests we constructed. Both ZAP 
and HTML5Sec attack repositories found the same 
vulnerabilities. However, we found several  vulnerabilities that 
cannot be detected by ZAP and HTML5 Security cheat sheet 
attack repositories. One example is  shown below.   
<div style="height: <%= escapeHtml(input) %>px; "> 
</div> 
The following attack string generated by our approach can 
detect this vulnerability.   
;background-image:url(‘javascript:attack()’); 
 
Attack repositories in ZAP and HTML5Sec rely on 
contributions from pentesting experts. Our approach 
systematically derives attack strings  based on a set of attack 
grammar. 
 
C. Computational  performance  
We looked at the performance of XSS unit testing using 
experiments performed on a desktop Mac with a 2.7 GHz Intel 
core i5 with 8GB RAM. Our attack generator produced 223 
attack strings, which were applied to each unit test.  For the 
iTrust pages we sampled, the average time to evaluate each 
XSS unit test against all attack vectors was 17 seconds. 
JSP files may contain multiple execution paths but only 
those containing  sinks with tainted variables will be tested.  
Our evaluation of 70 JSP pages in iTrust shows that on average 
a JSP file leads to 29 XSS unit tests. Average execution time to 
complete XSS vulnerability testing for a JSP file is thus 493 
zip = request.getParameter(“zip”) 
zip =zip.substring(0, 5); 
<a onclick=” func(‘ escapeHTML(<%= zip% >)’ ); “ ... > 
seconds or 8.2 min.  Generation of XSS unit tests is much 
faster than running all the tests. This performance is reasonable 
for our testing environment and can scale to a real world 
environment. 
VI. RELATED WORKS 
Researchers have investigated a variety of prevention and 
detection techniques to mitigate XSS vulnerabilities. 
Preventive approaches include secure programming guides to 
inform the developers to use encoding functions correctly. 
Well known guidelines include the  OWASP XSS cheat sheet 
[36] and best  practices by Graff and Wyk [16].  
Attempts have been made to automatically sanitize 
untrusted input using template languages. We discussed 
approaches for auto sanitization via type inference in section I 
[32, 33].  Technological restrictions, such as the use of 
template languages, means such approaches are not widely 
applicable to many legacy web applications.   
Johns et al. [24] have developed an abstract data type that 
strictly enforces data and code separation in a host language 
such as Java. However, this approach comes with a significant, 
25%, run-time overhead.  ScriptGard [33] is a run-time auto-
sanitization technique in ASP.Net similar to [18] for Java and 
WASP for SQL injection[19]. Advantages of these approaches 
are that they can automatically sanitize large scale legacy 
systems using a path-sensitive approach using binary code 
instrumentation. All these approaches require a runtime 
component that could incur runtime overheads. Furthermore, 
requiring a runtime component necessitates changes to existing 
infrastructures, such as browsers. Our approach works with all 
web languages (HTML, CSS, JavaScript) and requires no 
runtime support.   
Static analysis techniques are widely used to detect XSS 
vulnerabilities using taint analysis techniques [3, 17, 34, 39].  
The main disadvantage of static analysis is high false positive 
rates [15]. Furthermore, static analysis tools can only check for 
the existence of the sanitization functions and not evaluate their 
effectiveness [4]. Thus, static analysis cannot be used to 
address the context-sensitiveness of sanitization errors  [2].  
Dynamic analysis techniques aim to evaluate applications’ 
responses to detect any sanitization mistakes [12, 14, 26]. In 
the case of the black box testing, different algorithms such as 
combinatorial testing [6, 13], pattern-based algorithms [8, 25], 
and attack repositories [34] have been explored. Duchene et al. 
in [8, 10] proposed a control- and data- flow aware fuzzing 
technique. They use a state-aware crawler to record  
application requests and responses and use them to infer an 
application’s control and data flow. Fuzzing process is guided 
by  this information. The advantage of data flow inference is 
that it enables more accurate detection of stored XSS 
vulnerabilities. Because crawling-based inference is source-
code independent and it uses automatic form filling and 
pruning techniques,  the inferred control flow may not be 
complete, leading to potentially high false negatives. In 
contrast, we utilize source code analysis to extract all execution 
paths to avoid missing any sinks.  
McAllister et. al [27] proposed an interactive black-box 
vulnerability scanner. They aim to increase test coverage by 
leveraging user activities through guided fuzzing. However, 
relying on the user’s activities to increases test coverage is not 
complete and can lead to false negatives.  
There are other types of XSS sanitization functions (other 
than encoders) not addressed by our approach. Consider a 
blogging web site allowing use of HTML markup tags as input.  
HTML encoding functions are not proper here because they  
would disable all HTML markup tags. There are heuristic 
filters, e.g. [29], that try to block unwanted JavaScript 
programs in HTML body context. Such filters are difficult to 
verify as many patches have been issued.  
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In summary, we propose a unit testing approach to detect 
cross-site scripting vulnerabilities caused by incorrect encoder 
usage.  This  approach can be easily integrated into existing 
software development practices and can pinpoint the location 
of a vulnerability in the source code. It can help developers 
find and fix XSS vulnerabilities early in the development 
cycle, when they unit test their code, without involving security 
experts. The grammar-based attack generation is a structured 
way to generate XSS attack strings. We were able to generate 
tests for vulnerabilities missed by popular attack repositories. 
More importantly, our grammar models can be modified to 
cover unknown or new attack scenarios. For example, a new 
version of a browser may offer new ways for attackers. Our 
approach also has low false positive rates. Finally, our 
evaluation demonstrates that our approach is computationally 
efficient and can detect vulnerabilities cannot be found using 
black-box fuzzing systems.  
 
This work can be extended in a number of ways. We are 
currently evaluating our approach with  more open source 
applications. We also plan to look at handling recursive 
structures in the attack grammar as well as improve the 
efficiency of attack evaluation. 
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